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ABSTRACT
"Sell-side" analysts advise fund managers with recommendations to buy or sell a stock.
But being compensated with commissions proportional to the amount traded can drive the
analyst to bias his advice. In a two-agent model, it is notably shown that the probability
of a biased equilibrium to occur increases with commission rate, but decreases with the
weight of analyst rating. Moreover, the fund manager can cross-check the recommendation
with his own signal –this may represent access to an in-house "buy-side analyst". The fund
manager does not necessarily follow the sell-side analyst if its own signal is precise enough
. The model hence provides a theoretical rationale for recent empirical results about the
independance of sell-side analysts.
JEL Classi…cation : G24, D84
Key Words : Financial Analsysts, Brokerage, Stock Recommendations.
RESUMÉ
Les analystes "sell-side" procurent des recommandations d’achat ou de vente d’actions
en Bourse aux gérants de fonds. Ils sont rémunérés proportionnellement aux montants
échangés sur les marchés, ce qui peut conduire ces analystes à biaiser leurs recommenda-
tions. Dans un modèle à deux agents, on montre que la la probabilité d’occurence d’un
équilibre sur-optimiste augmente avec le taux de commission de courtage, mais diminue
avec le poids de la notation de l’analyste dans sa rémunération. De plus, le gérant de
fonds peut croiser la recommandation avec sa propre information privée -cela fait référence
aux analystes "buy-side" interne à la société de gestion de portfeuille. Le gérant ne suit
pas nécéssairement l’analyste, si son information privée est su¢sament précise. Ce modèle
corrobore des résultats empiriques récents sur l’indépendance des analystes …nanciers.
Classi…cation JEL : G24, D84
Mots-clefs : Analystes …nanciers, commissions de courtage, recommandations bour-
sières.
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Since a handful of years, …nancial market regulators in Europe and the United States
are trying to reform the payment mode of …nancial analysts’ recommendations. Analysts
are suspected to intentionally reveal erroneous informations to the fund managers they
are supposed to loyally advise. This is measured by a forecast bias –a gap between the
recommendation and the realized stock price– which is generally an optimistic bias: the
analyst recommends to buy a stock which price ends up decreasing or stagnating1.
What is exactly the source of the problem? Several factors are mentioned in the
literature. The …rst one is linked to cognitive and psychological bias (for a survey restricted
to …nance, see Hilton 2001) : analysts make systematic errors in the decision-making
process by using heuristics that leads to fail taking into account all available information,
or at least to emphasize or minimize the importance of some information. If such bias
are certainly important, they do not su¢ciently help regulators to implement reforms.
The other factors are strategic, "rational" sources of bias. Concerning the relation to the
…rms recommended, the analyst is forced to over-optimistic recommendation in order to
preserve friendly relationships with the …rm’s managers : they are the main information
provider to the analyst and could threat to cease relationships if the analyst release
unfavorable recommendations (Francis & Philbrick 1993, Lim 2001). The bias can also
come from investment banking relationships. Investment bank can pressure the brokerage
house and the analyst to issue unduly favorable recommendations (Barber, Lehavy &
Trueman 2007, Dugar & Nathan 1995, Hayward & Boeker 1998, O’Brien, Hsiou-Wei &
McNichols 2005). Nevertheless, these aspects have already received regulatory answers
which begin to be detected in available databases (Kadan, Madureira, Wang & Zach 2006).
Another source of bias has been paid less attention : the incentive to generate broker-
age commissions. A "sell-side" analyst is a member of a brokerage house. Its pro…t comes
from a percentage of trade orders executed in the stock market. Their main clients are
fund managers. Besides the execution of orders, the brokerage house can o¤er …nancial
services including private access to analysts’ recommendations. The payment of such ser-
vices are bundled with the commissions2. This payment system can entail a con‡ict of
interest if the expected revenue from a recommendation depends on the volume of trade
1Analyst issue several other forecasts, such as earnings forecasts. Considering forecasts or recommen-
dations does not dramatically change the biased nature of the advice. In the model we will focus on
recommendations.
2Recent reforms has introduced the possiblity to unbundle the payments. In United Kingdom and
France, a fund manager can assign a part of commissions to a …rm which is di¤erent than the …rm
which execute the order. But this does not change the fact that the payement of the recommendation is
proportional to the volume of trade.
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that this recommendation will incur. If the analyst thinks that a loyal recommendation
is not the most likely to generate trade commissions, he then faces a dilemma between
being reputed as a loyal analyst, and generating trading commissions for his …rm.
Can one illustrate the extent, and the limits, of the importance of brokerage commis-
sions in the advent of exaggeratedly optimistic recommendations? It is what this study
tries, using a two-agents model, in which an analyst exchanges with a fund manager a
recommendation against some volume of trade. It is shown that the rate of commission
is positively related to the probability of occurrence of a biased equilibrium, i.e. the sit-
uation where the analyst recommends the purchase of a stock although he thinks that
the fall is more probable, and that the best response of the fund manager, taking into
account his revised beliefs and available information, is to follow the opinion of the an-
alyst. Nevertheless, this is particularly tempered by (1) the information precision that
the fund manager privately receives, which illustrates the importance of cross-checking
information, for example by paying an in-house "buy-side" analyst; and (2) the possi-
bility to ex-post rate the analyst, i.e. by comparing his recommendation to the realized
state of the world. Furthermore, the model allows the fund manager to trade against the
recommendation of the analyst. This can explain the empirical results comparing buy-
and sell-side analysis presented in (Cheng, Liu & Qian 2006)
The general architecture of the model is that of the reputational herding models,
in which an adviser delivers a forecast to a receiver who then acts on the basis of this
forecast. One can refer in particular to studies which applied this model to …nancial
analysts (Trueman 1994, Graham 1999)3 . These models are themselves related to seminal
works on signalling games.
The description of behaviors (section 1) follows the logic of the model of Rachel Hayes
(1998). It is, as far as I know, the …rst formalization of the incentive to generate trading
commissions. However the model does not directly deal with strategic choice by the
analyst between honest or biased recommendation, but with the decision to cover or not
a company, and with the degree of e¤ort (and thus of quality) included in the production
of information. The result is that the brokerage incentive leads to favor stocks for which
one anticipates a high volume of trade.
3Brett Trueman (1994) tackles the idea that the forecasts of the …nancial analysts re‡ect their private
information exactly. It shows that is not inevitably the case since analysts seek to be favorably judged by
the investors, in order to build a reputation. In this case, one can reveal forecasts which are too close of
those put forward before by the other analysts, compared to what would require its private information,
. The model of John Graham (1999) shows that analysts can discard their private information, this
with an aim of appearing precise, skilful, and of building a good reputation. It speci…es moreover that
the propensity to put forth a biased recommendation varies according to certain factors, for example, it
decreases with the precision of signals received by the analyst.
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The de…nition of equilibrium in section 2 owes much to the model of Andrew Jackson
(2005). This model draws on the previous one, adding the Bayesian statistics of reputation
games. The choice is no longer about a continuous e¤ort function (the e¤ort e 2 [0; 1]), but
about a binary choice (favorable / unfavorable recommendation). The author shows the
existence of a biased equilibrium in which the analyst chooses a favorable recommendation
in order to generate trading volume, which overrides the objective of reputation reached
with a loyal recommendation. He shows in particular that biased equilibrium is all the
more probable since the investor is naive (he confers to the analyst a high probability
of being loyal), but all the less probable when the analyst has precise information and
a good reputation. We will refer to the Hayes-Jackson model to indicate this common
structure.
The new propositions of the model presented here, and some Hayes-Jackson propo-
sitions with more parsimonious assumptions, are mentioned in section 3. The uncertain
"type" of the analyst is only about his incentive to bias the recommendation, but there
is no need to consider a supplementary uncertain "type" about his signal’s precision
("smart"/"dumb" analysts). The case of "naive" investors is not considered, that is why
we refer to "fund manager". The fund manager has a private signal at his disposal, which
allows to endogenously deviate from the analyst. There is no need to assume an exogenous
probability of short sale constraint, as in the Hayes-Jackson model.
Section 4 brie‡y discusses regulatory reforms of sell-side analysts’ payment mode, in
the light of the results.
1 Environment and behaviors
1.1 Environment
Suppose a fund manager who has access to the information delivered by a sell-side analyst,
in exchange from what the manager trades with the analyst’s brokerage …rm. Information
refers to only one risky asset, a stock, which is perfectly divisible and whose price is P0
at the initial period t0. There are two possible states of the world in the future, the
favorable state H, in which the price of the risky is xH , and the unfavorable state L, in
which the price is xL. The state of the world is realized but in t0 but unobservable, it will
be revealed only in t2. We will use by convenience the term "future state" as a shortcut
to indicate "price observed after revelation of the favorable or unfavorable state", xH and
xL. Prices are such that :
xL < P0 < xH (1)
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At period t0, every agent observes the same probabilities ¸ :
Pr(xH) = ¸ = 0:5 (2)
Pr(xL) = 1 ¡ ¸ = 0:5
So that ¸ is the initial belief of agents.
At t0, each agent privately and receive a signal about the future state of the world.
The analyst receive sH (favorable) or sL (unfavorable), the fund manager receive yH
(favorable) or yL (unfavorable). This signal y can be viewed as internal information
transmitted by a buy-side analyst. As signals result from a personal e¤ort of possibly
di¤ering data interpretation, or from the private acquisition of new information, signals
are independent4 .
They all know the accuracy of their signals, which are:
Pr(sH j xH) = Pr(sL j xL) = p (3a)
Pr(yH j xH) = Pr(yL j xL) = z (3b)
Let us de…ne parameters p and z as the probabilities of receiving "correct" signals.
It is assumed that the analyst receives a more precise signal than the fund manager.
This is meant to capture the fact that the analyst is limited to a small number of stocks,
contrary to the fund manager who must screen a huge set of investment opportunity, as
the risky asset is only one element of his wealth5 .
Assumption 1 12 < z < p · 1
Note that following the fund manager’s signal is always strictly better than a random
choice (1=2), but strictly worse than a "perfect" signal (1). The probabilities to receive
"incorrect" signals are:
Pr(sH j xL) = Pr(sL j xH) = 1¡ p (4)
Pr(yH j xH) = Pr(yL j xL) = 1 ¡ z (5)
The fund manager must decide the amount of risky asset to possess. He has to revise
his initial belief ¸ with the help of his signal y. He cannot observe the signal of the
analyst s but only his recommendation r (with rH the favorable and rL the unfavorable
recommendation). Thus he will decide depending on r and y:
4Suppose for example that the analyst uses a bottom-up approach and the fund manager a top-down
approach.
5Saying this means that I have in mind "stock-picking" style fund managers. Index fund only replicates
a stock index, thus they do not need to pay for fundamental analysis.
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The analyst must decide which recommendation r to reveal. He has two objectives :
to generate trading commissions, and to enhance his reputation. The reputation is given
by the fund manager, when he rates the analyst, by comparing the observed state of the
world with the recommendation the analyst gave him.
The aim of the model is to study a Nash equilibrium. At time t1, the analysts sends
r, which is a best response to the fund manager’s strategy, and the fund manager de…ne a
traded volumeV , which is a best response to the strategy of the analyst. At t2, the state
H or L is revealed, and the fund manger rates the analyst. This kind of game need not
be repeated. Like in (Ramakrishnan & Thakor 1984, Scharfstein & Stein 1990, Graham
1999), the fact to assess ex-ante the expected ex-post reputation is su¢cient to ensure
that it is not a dominant strategy for the analyst to systematically lie. It is not necessary
to build a reputation through time, as in Sobel (1985).
Before going farther, let us precise that when variables are indexed by the binary
states H and L, the index is not mentioned when all cases are considered. For example,
mentioning (s; r) refers to (sH ; rH), (sH ; rL), (sL; rH), (sL; rL). Mentioning the couple
(s = r) refers to the subcases where indexes are the same, i.e. (sH; rH) and (sL; rL):
Hence (s 6= r) refers to the subcases where indexes are di¤erent, i.e. (sH; rL) and (sL; rH):
1.2 Fund Manager’s behavior
1.2.1 Trading volume decision
As in Hirshleifer (1971) and Jackson (2005), the utility function is logarithmic, U =
ln(W+ net gain) where W is the the wealth of the fund manager apart from the risky
asset. With P0 the price of the stock at t0 and °0 the quantity owned at t0, if the agent
invested °0 stocks and that the price becomes xH , his net gain is °0(xH ¡P0): If the price
becomes xL, the net gain is °0(xL ¡ P0): At t0 the fund manager must chose the optimal
level of quantity to hold, °¤0:
Thus he must maximize expected utility:
E(U) = ¸ ln(W + °0(xH ¡ P0)) + (1 ¡ ¸) ln(W + °0(xL ¡ P0)) (6)
with respect to °, which yields °¤0 :
°¤0 =
¡W [¸(xH ¡ P0) + (1 ¡ ¸)(xL ¡ P0)]
(xH ¡ P0)(xL ¡P0) (7)
Now consider as the fund manager’s initial endowment. At t1, he has to modify this
quantity, as long as he revises his initial belief conditionally to his own signal and the
recommendation. The revised belief ¸0 is:
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¸0 = Pr(xH j y; r) (8)
1¡ ¸0 = Pr(xL j y; r)
By analogy he can compute °¤1, which gives the same result as (7) but with ¸0 instead
¸. Computing the di¤erence °¤1 ¡ °¤0 gives the volume traded.
°¤1 ¡ °¤0 = (¸0 ¡ ¸) ¤ W [(xL ¡ P0) + (xH ¡ P0)](xL ¡ P0)(xH ¡ P0) (9)
V ´ (¸0 ¡ ¸) ¤ ®
Where ® is a strictly positive amount and V the volume traded on the basis of available
information.
1.2.2 Analyst rating decision
As in Ramakrishnan & Thakor (1984) and Jackson (2005) the analyst is evaluated ex-post.
But I use this device here in order not to postulate the natural and intangible division
between "smart" and "dumb" analysts. The manager does not have as a concern to guess
if the analyst is smart or dumb, but to know if its recommendation will be right. Formally
that does not dramatically changes things, but the interpretation of the model will be thus
in conformity with the observation. Indeed, some empirical investigations showed that
fund managers pays less attention to analyst ranking than to the comparison between his
own information and the one given by the sell-side analyst6 .
Let the rating of the analyst vary between 0 and 1. At the end of the game, the fund
managers compares the recommendation r with the price x, and decides to increase the
rating by n if it was correct (r = x) or to decrease it by the same amount n if it appears
to be incorrect (r 6= x).
To simplify, assume that the initial rating is N0 = 0:5. The the range of n is n 2 [0; 1=2]
and it gives the …nal rating N 2 [0; 1], which is de…ned by:(
N = 0:5 + n if r = x
N = 0:5¡ n if r 6= x (10)
The scale of N bears no importance, we will see that only the variation of the rating
(n) has a role to play.
6See for example Barker (1998) or Galanti (2006).
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1.3 Analyst’s behavior
The …rst objective of the analyst is to generate trading commissions. Let c 2 [0; 1] be
the percentage trading commission rate. The analyst must compute E(V ),the expected
trading volume. It depends on the belief of the fund manager about the future price, and
this belief in turn depends on the recommendation r; and on the fund manager’s signal y.
As long as the analysts ignores y, the best he can do is to use his own signal as a proxy.
Hence he will compute cE(V j r; s):
The second objective is to have the best possible rating. Let k 2 [0;1) be the weight
of the rating in the analyst’s utility. A high (low) k means that the analyst do (not) care
a lot about reputation. The rating depends on the comparison between r and x, unknown
at the date of computation. Again he will use x, the best available signal about x: The
program of the analyst is then:
max
r
fc:E(V j r; s) + k:E(N j r; s)g (11)
As the choice is binary, the obvious maximization consists in comparing the two pos-
sible cases. The analyst will choose rL if:
c:E(V j rL; s) + k:E(N j rL; s) > c:E(V j rH ; s) + k:E(N j rH ; s) (12)
and rH in the contrary.
Our goal is to illustrate which parameters determine an equilibrium with a biased
recommendation. The term biased recommendation means that it is di¤erent from the
signal received (s 6= r) , and loyal recommendation means that it is accorded to the signal
(s = r):
It is then necessary to assume that there exists some asymmetry in the model to
generate non-trivial results. In Sobel (1985), Sharstein and Stein (1990) and Graham
(1999) and Jackson (2005) for instance, they posit a probability of being a smart analyst
(with precise signals) or a dumb one (with non-informative signals). I posit that the
asymmetry depends on the nature of the message sent:
Assumption 2 If the analyst receives a favorable signal, he sends a loyal recommendation
(if sH, then rH). If the analyst receives an unfavorable signal, then with probability ¼ he
sends a loyal recommendation (if sL, then rL), and with probability 1 ¡ ¼, he sends a
biased recommendation (if sL, then rH)
In the following we will de…ne as a biased (loyal) equilibrium the one containing biased
(loyal) recommendation. It is important to insist that the previous assumption is not an
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ad hoc assumption, as long as 1/ the goal is not to generate a biased equilibrium but to
study the parameters that cause its occurrence, 2/ the analyst must still compute (12)
to make his decision, 3/ the bias is not automatic, but only probable, 4/ the probability
¼ can be fully de…ned and depends on the parameters of the model, as we will see in
the next section, and 5/ even in a biased equilibrium, the fund manager can trade in the
opposite direction than the one indicated by the (possibly biased) recommendation.
1.4 Information structure
Figure (1) subsume the previous paragraphs by representing the information structure.
Figure 1: Information structure
 
 1-p  1-p  1-p  1-p 
 1-p  1-p  1-p  1-p  1-p  p   p   1-p  1-p  p   
p   1-p 
xH xL 
sL sH 
yH yH yL yL 
loyal biased loyal  loyal loyal  biased biased biased 
sH sH sH sH sH sH sH sL sL sL sL sL sL sL 
rL rH rH rH rH rH rH rH rH rH rH rH rH rL rL rL 
 1-z  z  
z   1-z 
 p   p  p   p  
 p   p   p   p 
?=0.5 1-?=0.5 
Variables "on" the branches are probabilities, those at the nodes are the corresponding
events. The signals (y; s) have probabilities (respectively z and p) conditioned to the
state realized (x). Probability ¼ is independent from the realization of the state and from
signal y. The recommendation r depends on the event loyal / biased and on the signal
s. The concept solution used here to determine the equilibrium is the prefect Bayesian
equilibrium, which is de…ned as sequentially rational given the beliefs of the agents.
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2 Equilibrium characterization
The perfect Bayesian equilibrium is the solution concept used to identify an equilibrium
in the game. The agents decisions are sequentially rational given their beliefs, and the
beliefs are revised using Bayes’ rules. We have seen that the volume traded V is the best
response for the fund manager, and that playing rL given sH is an o¤-the-equilibrium
path. Thus, to de…ne equilibrium, we must study the choice of the analyst. One can
rewrite his decision rule (12) as follows. The analyst will choose rL if:
k:fE(N j rL; s)¡ E(N j rH ; s)g > cfE(V j rH; s)¡ E(V j rL; s)g (13)
and rH in the contrary. The sign of the di¤erences between expected ratings, and
expected volumes, depend on the signal received by the analyst. Let us study …rst the
expected rating di¤erence, then the expected volume.
2.1 Expected rating
Consider sL, then sH .
2.1.1 Expected rating with unfavorable signal sL
The aim is to compute:
E(N j rL; sL) ¡ E(N j rH ; sL) (14)
Following (10) if sL and rL are realized, the rating becomes 0:5 + n if xL is observed
or 0:5 ¡ n if xH is observed. Note that x is conditional on s but not on r, since it is the
knowledge of s that gives information to the analyst and obviously not the decision about
r, a redundant and potentially biased information r:Expecting the rating considering the
unfavorable recommendation case (rL) gives:
E(N j rL; sL) = (0:5¡ n) Pr(xH j sL) + (0:5 + n) Pr(xL j sL)
= (0:5 ¡ n)(1 ¡ p) + (0:5 + n)p
= 0:5 + n(2p ¡ 1)
and in the favorable recommendation (rH) case:
E(N j rH ; sL) = (0:5 + n) Pr(xH j sL) + (0:5¡ n) Pr(xL j sL)
= (0:5 + n)(1¡ p) + (0:5 ¡ n)p
= 0:5 ¡n(2p ¡ 1)
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Note that the strength of the rating revision, expressed by n(2p¡1); depends positively
on the analyst’s signal precision p. Rewriting (14) it is straightforward to show that it is
always positive since Pr(xH) = ¸ = 0:5:
E(N j rL; sL) ¡ E(N j rH ; sL) = 2n(2p ¡ 1) > 0 (15)
that means that conditional to sL, on average, the rating of a loyal recommendation is
always higher than the rating of a biased recommendation.
2.1.2 Expected rating with favorable signal sH
Again, we compute:
E(N j rL; sH) ¡ E(N j rH ; sH) (16)
which gives:
= ¡2n(2p ¡ 1) < 0 (17)
This means that on average and whatever the signal received, the rating of a loyal
recommendation is always higher than the rating of a biased recommendation. Although
unsurprising, this reputation result is necessary for the consistency of the model. It
is obtained in a di¤erent manner from the Hayes-Jackson model. The fund manager
cannot observe the intentions of the analyst (his loyalty) by comparing his signal s to his
recommendation r, but by rating the analyst on the basis of his acts, he has an e¢cient
credibility constraint device at his disposal.
2.2 Expected trade
After having examined the left member of expression (13) we now turn to the right
member.
2.2.1 Expected trade with unfavorable signal sL
We study the sign of:
E(V j rH ; sL)¡ E(V j rL; sL) (18)
As seen in (9), the traded volume V depends on the revised belief of the fund manager,
denoted ¸0(y; r) = Pr(x j y; r): Details about ¸0(y; r) are given in annex A (p.25).
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We have:
E(V j rH ; sL) = ®(¸0(yH ; rH) ¡ 0:5)Pr(yH; rH) (19)
+®(¸0(yL; rH) ¡ 0:5)Pr(yL; rH)
= ®f2z(1 ¡ (1¡ p)¼) ¡ 1
2
g(1
2
¡ 1
4
¼) + ®f2(1¡ z)[1 ¡ (1¡ p)¼] ¡ 1
2
g(1
2
¡ 1
4
¼)
= ®(
1
2
¡ 1
4
¼)[2(1¡ (1¡ p)¼)¡ 1]
= ®(1
2
¡ 1
4
¼)(1 ¡ 2(1¡ p)¼)
Idem:
E(V j rL; sL) = ®(¸0(yH ; rL)¡ 0:5) Pr(yH ; rL) (20)
+®(¸0(yL; rL) ¡ 0:5)Pr(yL; rL)
= ®f2z(1 ¡ p)¼ ¡ 1
2
g1
4
¼+ ®f2(1¡ z)(1 ¡ p)¼ ¡ 1
2
g1
4
¼
= ®
1
4
¼f2(1¡ p)¼ ¡ 1g
We can now study the sign of :
E(V j rH ; sL) ¡ E(V j rL; sL)
= ®(
1
2
¡ 1
4
¼)(1¡ 2(1 ¡ p)¼)¡ ®1
4
¼f2(1¡ p)¼ ¡ 1g
= ®
1
2
(1¡ 2(1 ¡ p)¼)
Since ® is positive, and ¼ 2 [0; 1] and 0 < (1¡ p) < 0:5 (because p is strictly superior
to 12 since there always is a signal of precision z such that 0:5 < z < p); we have:
¡2(1 ¡ p)¼ 2 [¡1; 0] and 1 < (1 ¡ 2(1 ¡ p)¼) < 2. The sign of the di¤erence is then
strictly positive (which joins up with proposition 1, iv, c of Jackson 2005).
Proposition 1 When the analyst receives an unfavorable signal, the expected trading
volume conditional to a biased recommendation is always superior to the expected trading
volume conditional to a loyal recommendation: E(V j rH ; sL) > E(V j rL; sL)
2.2.2 Expected trade with favorable signal
We study the sign of:
E(V j rH ; sH)¡ E(V j rL; sH)
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Note that the case sH ; rL is excluded by assumption 2. First we have:
E(V j rH ; sH) = ®(¸0(yH; rH) ¡ 0:5)Pr(yH; rH) + ®(¸0(yL; rH) ¡ 0:5) Pr(yL; rH)
We can remark that this is by de…nition equal to E(V j rH ; sL), hence:
E(V j rH ; sH) = ®(12 ¡
1
4
¼)(1 ¡ 2(1 ¡ p)¼)
and:
E(V j rL; sH) = ®(¸0(yH ; rL) ¡ 0:5) Pr(yH ; rL) +®(¸0(yL; rL)¡ 0:5) Pr(yL; rL)
which is by de…nition equal to E(V j rL; sL) :
E(V j rL; sH) = ®14¼f2(1¡ p)¼ ¡ 1g
Thus we can express:
E(V j rH; sH) ¡ E(V j rL; sH)
= ®
1
2
(1¡ 2(1¡ p)¼) > 0
Then we can complete proposition 1,
Proposition 2 The expected volume of a favorable recommendation is always superior
to the expected volume of an unfavorable recommendation, may the recommendation be
biased, hence E(V j rH; sH) > E(V j rL; sH) ; or loyal (prop.1), hence: E(V j rH ; sL) >
E(V j rL; sL)
We can now state that the behavior that is forbidden by assumption 2 (playing rL
following sH) is not an equilibrium behavior, because the analyst would be losing both
from the reputation point of view –as biased recommendation entails a lower rating, see
(17)– and from the trading volume commission point of view –it is proposition 2.
2.3 Decision rule
We can now comment the analyst decision rule (13). The analyst will choose rL if:
k:fE(N j rL; s)¡ E(N j rH ; s)| {z }
> 0 if sL (loyal)
< 0 if sH (biased)
g > cfE(V j rH; s)¡ E(V j rL; s)| {z }
always > 0
g
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Thus if sH is received, the inequality above is never true, then the analyst will choose
rH . If sL is received, then the result depends on the weighting parameters c and k.7
Isolating k; the analyst will choose rL if:
k ¸ cfE(V j rH ; s) ¡ E(V j rL; s)gfE(N j rL; s) ¡ E(N j rH ; s)g
Let us de…ne k¤, the k¡threshold which determines which recommendation to choose
when receiving sL :
k¤ =
cfE(V j rH; sL) ¡ E(V j rL; sL)g
fE(N j rL; sL) ¡ E(N j rH ; sL)g (21)
So that the decision rule of the analyst …nally is :8>>>><>>>>:
if sH then rH
if sL then
rL if k ¸ k¤
rH if k < k¤
(22)
Now the equilibrium situation can be de…ned.
De…nition 1 The recommendation r of the analyst which complies with (22), and the
corresponding trading volume V = ®(¸0(y; r) ¡ 0:5) chosen by the fund manager, are
forming an equilibrium.
The parameter k, which represents the weighting of rating in the analysts payo¤,
i.e. the importance of reputation, help us determine the probability ¼ mentioned in
assumption 2:
Pr(k ¸ k¤) = ¼ (23)
Pr(k < k¤) = 1 ¡¼
This con…rms ¼ as being the probability that the analyst is loyal and 1 ¡ ¼ the
probability that he is (optimistically) biased. Hence this must be seen, respectively, as
the probabilities of a loyal (biased) equilibrium to occur. In the next section we specify
how k¤ reacts to shocks on the other parameters and study if the fund manager can
"de-bias" the recommendation.
7 It is assumed than if the two side of the equation are equal, the analysts chooses to be loyal, so we
now write as a "suprior or equal" inquality.
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3 Equilibrium properties
The aim of this section is to examine how k¤, and hence, how the probabilities of occur-
rence of equilibria can occur. This will help us draw some conclusion about the bias in
analysts recommendations.
3.1 Study of threshold k¤
Rewrite the previous de…nition (21) as:
k¤ =
c®
2 (1¡ 2(1 ¡ p)¼))
2n(2p ¡ 1) (24)
This expression shows that k¤ depends on parameters c, p, n and ® (with ® being
calculated from the wealth W and prices P0; xH and xL). But it also depends on ¼.
As by de…nition, ¼ is a function of k¤ since Pr(k ¸ k¤) = ¼, we must explicitly posit a
cumulative distribution function for f (k): For the sake of simplicity, I have chosen the
continuous uniform distribution.
3.1.1 The f (k) function
The choice of probability distribution is not important to our subject. However, the
two boundaries a and b of a uniform distribution must be chosen in order to ease the
interpretation of the results. So we must restrict the support of k, which was initially any
real positive number. After some simulations, it appeared that 0 and 100 were satisfying
boundaries as they admit the two possible behavior from the analyst (loyal or biased) for
large set of parameters. Now de…ne:
f (k) = Pr(k < k¤) = 1¡ ¼
with the properties of a probability distribution following a continuous uniform cumu-
lative density function with parameters (0; 100) :
f(k) = 0 if k · 0
f(k) =
k
100
if 0 < k < 100
f(k) = 1 if k ¸ 100
It is as if the analyst would sort randomly a real number between 0 and 100, each time
he has to send a recommendation. This number k gives him the weight of rating (i.e. of
reputation) in his utility function.
The function is given in …gure (2).
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Figure 2: Cumulative density function
 
k 
0 
f(k) 
1 
100 
0 
f(k*) 
k* 
p 
1-p 
Let us take a numerical example. Suppose that k¤ = 25: Then f(k¤) = 25100 = Pr(k <
k¤) = 1¡ ¼. Hence ¼ = 0:75: In general terms, we can de…ne:
¼ = 1¡ k
¤
100
(25)
The next two subsections interpret this expression and explain the sequence of events.
3.1.2 Computation of k¤
From the original expression (24), we simply replace ¼ with 1 ¡ k¤=100: After some
calculations –details in annex B, (p.27)– it yields:
k¤ =
c®(1¡ 2(1¡ p))
4n(2p ¡ 1)¡ 2102 c®(1¡ p)
(26)
This is the expression of k¤ we will use henceforth. Let us take a numerical example
in order to illustrate what this threshold means. Suppose that the following parameters
holds:
® c n p
300 0:03 0:05 0:8
Replacing with (26) we round o¤ k¤ = 64; 2: It means that ¼ = 1¡ 64:2100 = 35:8%: The
probability for the analyst to be loyal is 35.8%, the probability of the analyst to be biased
is 64.2%. If we now replace ¼ by its value 0.358 in the original expression of k¤ (i.e. 24),
that con…rms k¤ = 64:2:
Studying how k¤ reacts to shocks on parameters ®; c; n and p is useful, because:
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² if k¤ increases, the probability of the biased equilibrium to occur (i.e. an equilib-
rium with a favorable analyst recommendation and a unfavorable analyst signal)
increases. Because of the equilibrium de…nition (see 22 and sq.) and of the uniform
distribution chosen for ¼, then, all else equal, the higher k¤ is, the more there are
chances that the number k randomly sorted by the analyst is under this threshold
k¤, hence the more there are chances that the analyst chooses rH after receiving sL
, at equilibrium.
² Similarly, if k¤ decreases, the probability of the biased equilibrium to occur decreases.
Because, all else equal, the lower k¤ is, the more there are chances that the number
k randomly sorted by the analyst is above this threshold k¤, hence the less there are
chances that the analyst chooses rH after receiving sL , at equilibrium.
Note that writing "the probability to be loyal (biased)" is then similar to "the proba-
bility that the equilibrium with loyal (biased) recommendation occurs".
3.1.3 The sequence of events
The timeline is given in …gure (3).
Figure 3: Timeline
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analyst 
- x is realized but not 
observable 
- Agents know P0,  xL,  xH , W, 
(hence compute a), and n, c, 
precisions z and p. 
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- The analyst privately 
observes s and k, the fund 
manager privately observes y, 
- The analyst reveals r 
- The fund manager computes 
his revised belief and trades 
the volume V 
 
Now take a numerical example where a biased equilibrium arises. The parameter
values are the following.
® c n p z
20 0:1 0:1 0:8 0:55
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² At t = 0, agents know the fund manager wealth W = 40, the stock price P0 = 4,
the price that would prevail in the favorable state of the world xH = 10, and in
the unfavorable state xL = 1. From (9) they compute ® = 20. They know that,
n = 0:1; meaning that the rating of the analyst initially equal to 0.5 will be modi…ed
by a step of 0.1. The rating will increase (decrease) up to 0.6 (down to 0.4) if the
recommendation do (do not) correspond to the price x that will be observed in t = 2
. Agents also know that the percentage trading commission rate is c = 0:10, the fund
manager’s signal precision is z = 0:55 and the analysts’s signal precision is p = 0:80,
which allows them to compute k¤ and ¼: With (26) they compute k¤ = 5:1724 and
with (25) they obtain ¼ = 94:83%: The fund manager estimates that the analysts
has 94:83% chances of being loyal, and the analyst takes this into account in his
computation of the expected trade by the fund manager.
² At time t = 1, the fund manager privately observes y = yL, and the analyst privately
observes s = sL and k = 5: Since k < k¤, the analyst knows his interest is to reveal a
biased recommendation rH : He can check it by comparing the two expected utilities
from (12)
E(U(rL)) = c:E(V j rL; sL) + k:E(N j rL; sL) = 3:094
E(U (rH)) = c:E(V j rH ; sL) + k:E(N j rH; sL) = 3:832
So the analyst reveals rH : The fund manager’s two sources of information are hence
con‡icting. To decide, he computes his revised belief:
¸0(rH ; yL) = 0:729
The result shows that the price xH is now more probable than it was (¸ = 0:5).
Certainly because of the relatively high precision of the analyst and of the high probability
of being loyal, the best response of the fund manager is to …nd the analyst credible and
buy the stock, discarding his own unfavorable signal yL. The equilibrium trading volume
he chooses is:
V ´ (¸0 ¡¸) ¤ ® = 0:229 ¤ 20 = 4:586
² At t = 2, the price xL is revealed. The fund manager ends up with a net loss of
(xL ¡ P0) = ¡13; 758. If he had received a loyal recommendation, the net gain
would have been V (xH ¡ P0) = 74; 516: The fund manager downgrades the rating
of the analyst, which becomes 0,4.
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Note that if the analyst had randomly sorted a weight k = 6 (in fact any number
5:1724 > k ¸ 100) then, the weight of reputation would have overrode the weight of
the brokerage commission c, and thus his decision would have been to reveal a loyal
recommendation rL , leading to a loyal equilibrium. Before studying the reaction of k¤ to
parameters, it is important to precise that the fund manager will not necessarily follow
the biased analyst.
3.2 When the fund manager can "de-bias" the recommendation
Since the volume V played by the fund manager depends heavily on his revised belief ¸0
it seems worthy to study when this revision is made in the opposite direction than the
one indicated by the recommendation. The question is to know whether the revised belief
will lead the fund manager to think that the high price xH is more probable (¸0 > ¸),
hence entailing a positive V , i.e. a purchase, or that it is less probable (¸0 < ¸), entailing
a negative V , i.e. a sale.
Having in mind that we posited ¸ = 1=2, and with the following results (details in
Annex A, p.25), we can compare ¸0 with ¸ :
¸0(rH ; yH) = 2z(1¡ (1¡ p)¼)
¸0(rL; yL) = 2(1¡ z)(1¡ p)¼
¸0(rH ; yL) = 2(1¡ z)[1 ¡ (1¡ p)¼]
¸0(rL; yH) = 2z(1¡ p)¼
² Case 1. Whatever z; p and ¼ under assumptions 1 and 2, it is simple to show
that, when the two sources are corresponding, the revised belief always follows the
direction indicated. There is an upward revision and purchase (¸0(rH ; yH) > ¸)
when the analyst sends a favorable recommendation and the fund manager receives
a high signal ; and there is an downward revision and sale (¸0(rL; yL) < ¸) when
both the recommendation and the fund manager’s signal are unfavorable.
So the two interesting cases are when the recommendation con‡icts with the fund
manager’s signal.
² Case 2. When (rL; yH), the analyst is pessimistic and the fund manager is opti-
mistic. The fund manager will follow his own signal (and deviate from the analyst)
if ¸0(rL; yH) > ¸, i.e. when:
z > 1
4(1¡ p)¼ (27)
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and will deviate from his signal and sell the stock (follow the analyst) in the contrary.
But, under assumption 2, sending rL reveals that the analyst is loyal. As, under
assumption 1, his signal is the most precise, actually the fund manager will always follow
the analyst’s recommendation (see proof in Appendix A)
² Case 3. When (rH ; yL), the analyst is optimistic and the fund manager is pes-
simistic. The fund manager will follow his own signal and sell (and deviate from
the analyst) if ¸0(rH ; yL) < ¸, i.e. when
z > 1 ¡ 1
4(1¡ (1 ¡ p)¼) (28)
and will deviate from his own signal and buy (and follow the analyst) in the contrary.
To go farther, consider that the right-hand side of equation (28) is a z-function de-
pending on p. Then we can plot this function8 to compare the values of z and p. In the
zone above the z-curve, the fund manager will deviate from the analyst and sell; in the
zone under the z-curve, the fund manager will follow the analyst and buy (see …gure 4).
As we can see, the fund manager will deviate from the analyst when the precision of
its own signal z is "not too inferior" to the analyst’s signal precision p. That is what
expresses condition (28). On the other hand, the more precise is the analyst, the more
the fund manager has chances to follow him. To put it another way, the more p increases,
the more z has chances to be under the curve, rather than above the curve.
This leads to the following proposition.
Proposition 3 When the fund manager’s own signal and the analyst’s recommendation
are con‡icting (y 6= r) :
(a) if the analyst is pessimistic (rL; yH), the fund manager will necessarily follow him,
if the analyst is optimistic (rH; yL), the fund manager will follow him only in some cases
(b) When the analyst is optimistic, the fund manager will follow his own signal (and
deviate from the analyst’s recommendation) when its precision is "not too inferior" to the
analyst’s signal precision.
8As actually the probability ¼ is a function of k¤ which itself depends on our four-parameter set ®;
c; n and p, the function plotted here is much more complicated than its expression in (28) seems to be.
However, it neither changes the results nor their interpretation. So to plot the graph we need to give
some values to ®; c; n and to express ¼ as a function of p only. The graph here takes the same values as
our previous numerical example, ® = 20, c = 0:1 and n = 0:1: There always exists the two "zones" on
the graph, whatever are the values of the parameters ®; c; n.
21
Figure 4: Nature of the trade and signal’s precision
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This proposition joins up with anecdotal observations that fund manager can some-
times "de-bias" the analysts’ recommendation (Boni & Womack 2002, p.30). Recall there
always exist an ex-ante uncertainty about the intentions (loyalty/bias) of the analyst. The
fund manager can never be sure that the analyst is biased. But the fact that the fund
manager bene…ts from his private signal can sometimes help him to discard the analysts
suspected of "hyping" their recommendations in order to generate trading commissions.
For example, following the very numerical example of section (3.1.3) except for z, the
fund manager takes the opposite direction (he sells, because ¸0(rH ;yL) < 0:5) if z > 0:692.
Through this "fund manager’s signal", we must understand the importance of buy-side
analysts, those members of the fund manager’s team precisely in charge of giving an
unbiased, though less precise, information.
3.3 The determinants of the probability of bias
Interpret (26) as a k-function of each parameters successively, for example as k¤(c): Then
it yields (see details in appendix B, p.28-30) :
dk¤
dc > 0
dk¤
d® > 0
dk¤
dp < 0
dk¤
dn < 0
All else equal, the probability of bias (1 ¡ ¼ = k¤100) increases with the percentage
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trading commission rate (c), and the size of the amount traded (®), but decreases with
the analyst’s signal precision (p) and with the size of the revision of analyst rating (n).
These are the following propositions.
Proposition 4 The probability of bias increases with the commission rate.
This result shows that it is not inconsistent to think that the brokerage commission
incentive has an important role in the recommendation bias of the analysts. It is congruent
with studies showing a positive relation between the over-optimism of analysts and the
situation of the brokerage …rm in terms of market shares or in terms of pro…t size (Aitken,
Muthuswamy & Wong 2000, Irvine 2004).
Proposition 5 The probability of bias increases with the size of the trade.
This is similar to Hayes (1998) main result, according to witch the trading commission
incentives strengthen when the size of the trade is high.
Now the next proposition is true under a slight condition (details in appendix B p.29),
which is that if p takes a precise value near 1=2 the probability can not be de…ned. Under
the condition that p is di¤erent from this peculiar value, the following proposition holds.
Proposition 6 The probability of bias decreases with the precision of the analyst’s signal
This is one of the main conclusions of herding models applied to …nance, where biased
behaviors are held by the less precise, "dumb", low-ability, less experienced analysts
(in particular Jackson, 2005). The proposition also illustrates tests showing a negative
relation between analysts’ forecast bias and several proxies for precision (analysts in the
top ranking, or analysts with upward career paths (for example Hong & Kubik 2003).
Proposition 7 The probability of bias decreases with the size of the variation of analyst
rating.
With analyst rating, the fund manager has a credible threat. The larger the variation
of analyst rating, the more the analyst is deterred of biasing his recommendation. As
the proposition 4, this last proposition is a new one, derived from the new way of taking
into account the weight of reputation. It seems to support the claims for systematic and
transparent analyst rating. For example, McNamee (2002) states that rating is "the only
cure" to analysts’ bias. Firms like Bureau van Dijk, Reuters or Bloomberg sell rating
software which rate the analyst comparing the recommendation to realized evolution of
prices or earnings. Many funds also build their in-house rating, called "broker review" by
professionals. The ex-post surveillance of the quality of advice has a rationale.
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4 Discussion
The limits of the sort of model presented concern both prices and volumes. First, the fund
manager trade does not have any impact on prices –hence he cannot form any strategies
conditional to this impact. Second, the manager cannot endogenously choose not to
participate in the market (in the Hayes-Jackson model the may not participate according
to an exogenous probability of short sale constraint).
However, it helps shed some light on the debates about the reform of "sell-side" bro-
kerage houses analysts’ payment mode. In recent reports (FSA 2003, AMF 2005b), Fi-
nancial Market Regulators explore one way of limiting the trading commission incentives
that biases recommendations. They implicitely admit that deontological codes exhorting
analysts to be loyal do not su¢ce, by promoting the unbundling of brokerage commissions.
The idea is that the fund manager can allow a percentage of the trading commission
to an analysts bureau that is di¤erent from the brokerage house executing the market
order. For example, if the total commission is c £V , he can allow say 50% of the total to
the brokerage house A for payment of the execution of the trade, and the remaining 50%
of the total to a brokerage house B where an analyst gave a satisfactory recommendation.
But there are reasons to be skeptical about this reform. As it lowers the impact of the
commission rate c on the incentive to bias, it takes in the right direction. But it is
illusory to think that it will utterly suppress the incentive, as for the whole community
of analysts still have an interest in generating trade. Furthermore there are many other
practical reasons that drive fund managers and individual investors to pay less attention
to unfavorable (and, hence, loyal) recommendations (see Boni & Womack 2002, p.110).
The core of the problem is that the adviser is not independent : his payment depends on
the nature of his advice.
So the most radical reform to ensure the independence of analysts would be to separate
them from brokerage houses. If c = 0 the probability of bias is obviously zero. The 2002-
2003 "General Settlement" by New York General Attorney provides for …nancing …nancial
services independent from trading commissions.
Yet the e¢ciency of this reform this would probably be limited by a decrease in sell-
side analysts’ signal precision. They indeed bene…t from a daily access to the in-house
traders and to company managers. This position gives them the informational advantage
that justi…es our assumption 1. Independent analysts would certainly be separated from
this informationally advantageous position.
Still the model shows two factors that may preserve high-precision sell-side analysts
within brokerage houses, and though that may limit the trading commission incentives
: 1) systematically develop a¤ordable analyst rating, and 2) develop "buy-side" analysis
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besides the fund managers. Whether developing these two factors is really a better solution
for the …nancial community as a whole should be more explored.
Appendix
Appendix A. Revised beliefs
Pr(x j y; r) is de…ned as ¸0(y;r): Then,
Pr(x j y; r) = Pr(x j r)Pr(y j x)
Pr(y)
Pr(y j x) are given as the fund manager’s signal. Other probabilities must be computed.
Computation of Pr(y)
Use the partition of y over x:
Pr(yH) = Pr(yH j xH) Pr(xH) +Pr(yH j xL) Pr(xL)
= 0:5z + 0:5(1¡ z) = 0:5
As the sum of the information set is 1, we have:
Pr(yL) = 0:5
It is unsurprising since Pr(xH) = ¸ = 0:5 = Pr(xL).
Computation of Pr(x j r)
From (1.4), examine every situation starting from rH that can lead to xH : I develop
this …rst case and give only the result for the other cases.
Given the decision rule of the analyst, he can send rH only if he received sH in the
case he’s loyal, and whatever the signal in the case he’s biased. Whether he’s biased
(probability 1 ¡ ¼) or loyal (¼) do not depend on y as we will see, although the signal
received depends on x: Writing extensively all the path leading to rH starting from xH,
it yields:
Pr(xH j rH) = Pr(yH j xH) [Pr(xH j sH) fPr(loyal) + Pr(biais¶e)g+ Pr(xH j sL) Pr(biais¶e)]
+ Pr(yL j xH) [Pr(xH j sH) fPr(loyal) + Pr(biais¶e)g+ Pr(xH j sL) Pr(biais¶e)]
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= z[pf¼ + 1¡ ¼g+ (1¡ p)(1¡ ¼)] + (1¡ z)[pf¼ + (1¡ ¼)g+ (1¡ p)(1¡ ¼)]
Because of the partition on y and this can be simpli…ed:
Pr(xH j rH) = Pr(xH j sH)| {z }
if sH then rH whatever the type
+ Pr(xH j sL) Pr(biais¶e)| {z }
if sL then rH if biased analyst
= p+ (1 ¡ p)(1 ¡ ¼)
= 1¡ (1¡ p)¼
Using the same method for the other cases, it gives: :
Pr(xH j rH) = 1 ¡ (1¡ p)¼ (29)
Pr(xH j rL) = (1¡ p)¼
Pr(xL j rH) = p¼
Pr(xL j rL) = 1¡ p¼
Now compute the revised beliefs.
Revised belief ¸0(yH ; rH)
Remember that ¸0(yH ; rH) = Pr(xH j yH ; rH). Then,
¸0(yH ; rH) = Pr(xH j rH)Pr(yH j xH)Pr(yH) (30)
= 1 ¡ (1¡ p)¼ z
(1=2)
= 2z(1 ¡ (1¡ p)¼)
Revised belief ¸0(yL; rL)
Idem,
¸0(yL; rL) = Pr(xH j rL)Pr(yL j xH)Pr(yL) (31)
= 2(1 ¡ z)(1¡ p)¼
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Revised belief ¸0(yL; rH)
idem,
¸0(yL; rH) = Pr(xH j rH)Pr(yL j xH)Pr(yL) (32)
= 2(1 ¡ z)[1¡ (1 ¡ p)¼]
Revised belief ¸0(yH ; rL)
Idem,
¸0(yH ; rL) = Pr(xH j rL)Pr(yH j xH)Pr(yH) (33)
= 2z(1 ¡ p)¼
Each of the four revised belief mentioned has the revised belief about xL as a comple-
mentary event ; i.e. Pr(xL j y; r) = 1 ¡ ¸0(y; r). Hence summing the ¸0 has no particular
meaning.
Proof that the fund manager follows the analyst when rL
The aim is to show that condition (27) is not compatible with assumption 1. Write
simultaneously condition (27) and assumption 1:
p > z >
1
4(1¡ p)¼ (34)
() p(1 ¡ p) > 14¼ (35)
On the right-hand side of equation (35), the minimum value of 1=4¼ is 1=4. On the
left-hand side of the equation, recall that the minimum value of p tends towards 1=2 but
is superior to 1=2 since there always exists a z between the two. Hence the maximum of
p(1¡ p) tends towards 1=4 but is inferior to 1=4, so that equation (35) is never true.
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Appendix B. Computation of k*
Given the uniform probability density function chosen for ¼; replace ¼ by 1 ¡ k¤100 in the
expression above, then isolate k¤:
k¤ =
c®
2 (1¡ 2(1 ¡ p)¼))
2n(2p ¡ 1)
which yields
k¤ =
c®
2 (1¡ 2(1¡ p)(1 ¡ k
¤
100))
2n(2p ¡ 1)
() k¤ =
c®
2 ¡ c®2 (1¡ k¤100)(2(1¡ p))
2n(2p ¡ 1)
() k¤+
c®
2 (1¡ k¤100 )(2(1¡ p))
2n(2p ¡ 1) =
c®
2
2n(2p ¡ 1)
() k¤
µ
1 ¡
c®
2 (2(1¡ p))
100 ¤ 2n(2p ¡ 1)
¶
=
c®
2
2n(2p ¡ 1) ¡
c®
2 (2(1¡ p)
2n(2p ¡ 1)
() k¤ =
µ c®
2 ¡ c®2 (2(1 ¡ p))
2n(2p ¡ 1)
¶ µ
100 ¤ 2n(2p ¡ 1)
100 ¤ 2n(2p ¡ 1) ¡ c®2 2(1 ¡ p)
¶
() k¤ = 100
c®
2 (1¡ 2(1¡ p))
100 ¤ 2n(2p ¡ 1) ¡ c®(1 ¡ p)
() k¤ = c®(1¡ 2(1¡ p))
4n(2p ¡ 1)¡ 2102 c®(1¡ p)
Note that the upper bound parameter of the uniform probability function (102) is
clearly identi…ed ; chosen greater parameters(e.g. 109) in order to get "closer" to the initial
support of 0 < k < 1 do not changes the result but simply blurs their interpretations.
Before interpreting the sign of the derivatives, note the sign of the following expres-
sions:
1 · [1 ¡ 2(p ¡ 1)] < 2
0 < [2p ¡ 1] · 1
Derivative w.r.t. c
dk¤
dc is of the sign of:
®(1¡ 2(1¡ p))
µ
4n(2p ¡ 1)¡ 2c®
102
(1¡ p)
¶
+ c®(1¡ 2(1 ¡ p) 2®
102
(1¡ p)
= ®(1¡ 2(1¡ p)4n(2p ¡ 1) > 0
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k¤ is not de…ned when:
4n(2p ¡ 1)¡ 2
102
c®(1 ¡ p) = 0
() c = 200n(2p ¡ 1)
®(1¡ p)
which is generally higher than one (remember that c 2 [0; 1]). For example with
{p = 0:8; n = 0:1; ® = 20}, c must be di¤erent than 3.
Derivative w.r.t. ®
dk¤
d® is of the sign of:
c(1¡ 2(1 ¡ p))
µ
4n(2p ¡ 1) ¡ 2c®
102
(1 ¡ p)
¶
+ c®(1 ¡ 2(1¡ p) 2c
102
(1¡ p)
= c(1¡ 2(1 ¡ p)4n(2p ¡ 1) > 0
The derivative is positive except on a vertical asymptote at the point:
® =
200n(2p ¡ 1)
c(1¡ p)
For example if {p = 0:8; n = 0:1; c = 0:1} ® = 600.
Derivative w.r.t. p
dk¤
dp is of the sign of:
2c®(4n(2p ¡ 1))¡ c®(1¡ 2(1 ¡ p)(8n + 2c®
102
)
=
2®2c2
102 (2p+ 1)(p ¡ 1) < 0
The derivative is negative. Except for the vertical asymptote at point:
p =
4n + c®50
8n + c®50
The asymptote is always near 1=2, and k¤ is negative between 1=2 and the asymptote.
It means that for very low precision of his signal, the analyst is systematically loyal, then
after the asymptote the probability is very high and decreases slowly. For example with
{® = 20; n = 0:1; c = 0:1} the asymptote is p = 0:523, and the interpretation holds for
p > 0:523: As p < 0:523 is a very poor precision, and since 0:5 < z < p we can imagine
that the funds managers’s precision is relatively close from the one of the analyst, hence
a biased recommendation has no chances to succeed. In the contrary, if precision is just
a bit superior to the asymptote, the expectation to generate trading commissions o¤sets
the expected loss in reputation.
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Derivative w.r.t. n
dk¤
dn is of the sign of
¡®c(1¡ 2(1¡ p)4(2p ¡ 1) < 0
and k¤ is not de…ned for
n =
c®(1 ¡ p)
200(2p ¡ 1)
which is quite near to zero for large ranges of parameters (except when p tends towards
1=2, then n is in…nite if c tends towards 1). For example in our base case {p = 0:8; c = 0:1;
® = 20} the asymptote is at point n = 0:0006:
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